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ABSTRACT
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This paper clarifies the conceptual space of discussion of legal insanity by considering the virtues of the ‘medical
model’ model that has been used in Norway for almost a century. The medical model identifies insanity exclusively with mental disorder, and especially with psychosis, without any requirement that the disorder causally
influenced the commission of the crime. We explore the medical model from a transdisciplinary perspective and
show how it can be utilised to systematise and reconsider the central philosophical, legal and medical premises
involved in the insanity debate. A key concern is how recent transdiagnostic and dimensional approaches to psychosis can illuminate the law's understanding of insanity and its relation to mental disorder. The authors eventually raise the question whether the medical model can be reconstructed into a unified insanity model that is valid
across the related disciplinary perspectives, and that moves beyond current insanity models.
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1. Introduction
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The legal doctrine of criminal insanity concerns a criminal defendant's lack of capacity for responsible action and provides an excuse
from responsibility and punishment in most countries. Although it is
both ubiquitous and ancient in western legal systems, the criteria for
criminal insanity continuously stir controversy. Insanity rules differ
among jurisdictions (Simon & Ahn-Redding, 2008; Stuckenberg, 2016),
but commonly rely on disputed assumptions about mental disorders
(see inter alia, Slobogin, 2000; Hallevy, 2017) In the modern era, both
the justification for the doctrine and its adjudication depends heavily
on the teachings of psychiatry and on diagnostic categorisations. Psychosis appears to be central to the understanding of criminal incapacity
based on mental abnormalities (Moore, 2015), but the legal relevance
of psychosis is unclear.
Scholars disagree on which insanity model reflects the most adequate approach to provide legally, morally, and socially justifiable delimitation of criminal responsibility – and on whether the insanity doctrine can be defended at all (see inter alia, Slobogin, 2009; Goodin &

Bennet, 2018; Malasteti, Jurjako, & Meynen, 2020). The UN Convention on the rights of persons with disabilities has sparked debate about
whether there is a moral or lawful basis for people with mental impairment to be treated differently from others under the criminal law (see
inter alia UN Doc A/HRC/10/48, p.15; Minkowitz, 2014; Perlin, 2017).
The international discourse currently reflects a paradigmatic understanding of insanity that is mainly framed by Anglo-American law
(Sinnott-Armstrong & Levy, 2011). Following this paradigm, most
countries have modelled their rules (or practices) on a ‘mixed model’
which requires both a mental disorder criterion, and a functional causal
requirement that the disorder resulted in certain functional (cognitive
or control) impairments that influenced the commission of the crime
(Simon & Ahn-Redding, 2008; Stuckenberg, 2016). The ‘medical model’ identifies insanity exclusively with mental disorder, and whether the
disorder influenced the commission of the crime is not relevant. Such a
model has been used in Norway for almost a century, with psychosis as
a proxy for insanity (Gröning, 2021; Gröning, Haukvik, & Melle, 2019).
Noteworthy, it has been defended as a more justifiable approach to in-
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of these topics has generated a large amount of literature and many rival understandings of the premises of psychiatry and related control
systems for the justifications and content of insanity doctrine. This literature also includes critical accounts of psychiatric power (see inter alia,
Foucault, 1965).
The positive legal doctrines and practices are crucial for understanding the insanity defense. Law is a distinct normative enterprise that regulates social interaction (Van Hoecke & Warrington, 1988), with the
primary aim to guide behavior through practical reason. Any legal system's idea of the relation between mental disorder and responsibility is
transformed into rules and standards, primarily by legislators and
judges. These agents are guided inter alia by their social and cultural
context, constitutional principles and functional demands of the criminal justice system, such as regarding the possibility of proving criminal
(in)sanity (Gröning, 2015). This provides the insanity doctrine with
several legal features that are somewhat contingent to a specific legal
order. We know from previous research that different countries have
different insanity rules, different responses to people found to be insane
and different forensic systems (Goethals, 2018; Simon & Ahn-Redding,
2008; Stuckenberg, 2016). However, previous research also indicates
that the content of legal rules does not always correspond to the expected legal outcome of the application of the rules. Jurors' intuitive
prototypes may for instance shape their verdicts more than legal definitions of insanity (Ceci & Burd, 2016; Louden & Skeem, 2007). The tensions between rules and practical outcomes are also a product of the jurisdiction's legal culture. Thus, the law includes various kinds of rule-,
practice, and culture perspectives (Koch, Skodvin, & Sunde, 2017).
The insanity doctrine further relies on assumptions about the existence and nature of mental disorders and how these affect the individual's capacity for responsible behavior. This relates the law to the extensive mental health discourse that includes many different perspectives
on mental disorder, including neuroscientific, biological, and phenomenological perspectives. Law and neuroscience has in this regard developed into a large discourse (see inter alia, D'Aloia & Errigo, 2020).
However, current insanity doctrines especially include psychiatric (diagnostic) perspectives. Criminal insanity has been described as a ‘hybrid construct’ developed through the interplay between judges and
forensic psychiatric experts (Thom, 2010; Thom & Finlayson, 2013).
Scholars have also pointed to psychosis as central to a common western
idea of insanity (Moore, 2015; Wondemaghen, 2017, pp. 133–152),
drawing attention to the fact that many of those acquitted due to insanity are diagnosed with schizophrenia (Callahan, Steadman, McGreevy,
et al., 1991; Perlin, 2017b; Tsimploulis, 2018). Current psychiatric
practices are at the same time increasingly criticized in light of advancing scientific theory and data that challenges the categorical diagnostic
approach (see inter alia Jablensky, 2016; Scull, 2021). In addition, the
mental health discourse also recognizes the cultural perspective. It is
commonly acknowledged that the understanding and experience of serious mental disorders, for instance the content of psychotic delusions,
may vary across cultures (Gaebel & Zielasek, 2015).
We maintain that robust legal knowledge requires the consideration
of (at least) all these perspectives. The law is an argumentative enterprise that gains legitimacy through justifiable rules and judgments. This
requires that the premises involved in these justifications are internally
and externally valid (Peczenik, 2001). When the law links insanity to
philosophical and medical premises, these premises need to be valid
and consistent with each other. This is also a practical requirement, as
apparent inconsistencies in rules and judgments about criminal insanity
and mental disorder may weaken law's social legitimacy. If, for instance, insanity verdicts are justified through faulty statements about
how mental disorders affects individuals this may produce mistrust to
the correctness of these verdicts. Considering this importance of clarifying and linking the different premises and concepts at stake, we will
now turn our attention to the medical model as a possible unifying
structure.
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sanity (Moore, 2015), which challenges the insanity doctrines of most
countries (Bijlsma, 2018).
We argue that the medical model has not been sufficiently explored
in contemporary reconsiderations of insanity doctrines. A key challenge
is that the discussions about criminal insanity involve arguments, concepts, and premises from several fields, where law, psychiatry/psychology and philosophy are the most central to the debate. While each discipline provides valuable insights to the discussion, the transfer of knowledge across disciplines may produce confusion. When key concepts are
transferred between established disciplines, there is a risk of misunderstandings due to different definitions and interpretations of the concepts at hand.
Therefore, our aim is to clarify the conceptual space of the insanity
discussion by paying attention to the virtues of the medical model. We
will explore this model from a transdisciplinary perspective and show it
can be utilised to systematise and reconsider the central premises involved in the insanity debate.1 Our aim is not to defend or argue against
the medical model, but merely to discuss how it may function as a new
point of entry for studying criminal insanity. To obtain this, we propose
a conceptual framework that views criminal insanity as a multifaceted
phenomenon, consisting not only of legal, but also of philosophical and
medical elements. This framework thus utilizes the disciplinary fields
that are central to illuminate the law's understanding of insanity and its
relation to mental disorder. We will pay specific attention to recent
mental health research that involves transdiagnostic and dimensional approaches to psychosis (as a heterogeneous phenomenon that occurs
across diagnostic categories and with different degrees of seriousness),
because we consider such approaches more relevant to legal purposes
than the standard diagnostic use of categories. Eventually, we raise the
question whether the medical model can be remodelled into a unified insanity model that is consistent with the concepts and data from the involved disciplines.
The article is structured as follows. First, section 2 presents our conceptual framework and understanding of criminal insanity as a multifaced phenomenon. Section 3 turns to the medical model, and how our
conceptual framework could be utilised to explore it. Section 4 provides
reflections on the medical model as a gateway to a valid unified model.
Finally, section 5 offers brief concluding remarks.
2. Criminal insanity as a multifaceted phenomenon
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Building on our previous research, we begin with outlining a multifaceted conceptualisation of criminal insanity. This relies on a rational
reconstruction of legal concepts (Alexy & Peczenik, 1990; Bankowski,
MacCormick, Summers, et al., 2016, pp. 9–28) that recognizes that the
insanity doctrine relies on three basic assumptions: (1) Humans generally possess the capacity for responsible behavior; (2) mental disorders
can affect this capacity; and 3) criminal responsibility and punishment
require the capacity for responsible behavior (see inter alia Morse,
2016, pp. 239–276). As such, the insanity doctrine contains not only legal, but also philosophical, moral and medical perspectives.
In its philosophical elements, the insanity doctrine needs to be understood by metaphysical and normative premises at different levels of
abstraction (see inter alia, Moore, 1984). Any account of insanity is
shaped by how the various premises are understood and related to each
other. These premises concern both descriptive and normative accounts
of the requirements and limits of human agency, freedom of action and
responsibility, as well as of the nature of insanity and mental disorder.
The philosophical perspectives also include epistemic considerations,
concerning the transfer of knowledge between medicine and law. Each

1 The article, and its proposed methodology, is related to a research project,
funded by the Norwegian research council (DIMENSIONS | University of Bergen
(uib.no)), where we will explore the law's concepts of criminal insanity and psychosis within the framework of the medical model.
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3. The medical model as a possible unifying structure

Despite its manifest shortcomings in legal practice, we argue that a
medical model, as an ideal regulation model, may offer a framework for
exploring the philosophical, legal, and medical premises of the insanity
debate. In contrast to the insanity models used in most countries, this
model seems to adopt the premise that it is possible to link philosophical and normative standards for criminal responsibility directly to medical concepts and disorder definitions. By exploring how these key perspectives can be concretisised and related within such a model, we may
reach a new understanding of criminal insanity and the legal relevance
of mental disorder. In the following, we will outline the contours of
such an exploration and provide a practical sketch for addressing questions that needs further considerations.

3.1. The content and characteristics of the medical model used in
Norwegian law

OO

F

To explore the different premises involved in the insanity problem,
and how these are related, the medical model used in Norwegian law
provides an interesting framework. In general terms, we define a ‘medical model’ as a model that define insanity exclusively in terms of (some
kind of) mental disorder, without any requirement that this disorder
causally influenced the crime by affecting the cognitive or control capacities that seem related to the crime. Such a medical model has been
used in Norwegian law since 1929, when the 1902 Penal code was revised. Since 1929 there has been three major amendments of the insanity rules, the last as recent as 1 October 2020 (Gröning, 2021).
The medical model has thus been operationalized in Norwegian law
through different statutory rules. Before 2002, the legal criterion for insanity was ‘insane’ (sinnssyk), which captured those that today would
be considered ‘psychotic’. Between 2002 and 2020, the legal criterion
has been ‘psychotic’, reflecting the medical concept of psychosis in requiring significantly impaired reality understanding (Gröning et al., 2019).
This criterion was retained when the 2005 Penal code was enacted but
has recently been amended. The new rule that entered into force 1. October 2020 uses the disorder criterion ‘severe deviant state of mind’. It
also requires that the defendant was ‘insane due to’ his or her disorder,
which should be assessed in relation to the degree of failure of the defendant's understanding of reality and functional ability. Although this
rule thus has replaced the psychosis criterion, with a ‘common language’ disorder criterion that allow for a large degree of substantial judicial discretion, the essence of the medical model remains. Mental disorder is still sufficient for insanity, and psychosis is still central
(Gröning, 2021).
In recent years, the medical model has faced challenges in legal
practice. These challenges were made clear tothe public by the case that
followed Anders Behring Breivik's killing of 77 people in Oslo and on
Utøya on 22 July 2011 (TOSLO-2011-188,627-24). The case raised a
wide-ranging international debate about criminal insanity (see inter
alia, Wittig, 2013; Bortolotti et al., 2014; Moore, 2015). Was Breivik
driven by ideology or insanity? Was his ability to plan reconcilable with
insanity? Although the Norwegian penal code equated criminal insanity
with being ‘psychotic’, it did not provide enough guidance about the legal threshold for being psychotic and insane for the judges and experts.
Two pairs of experts concluded differently on Breivik's (in)sanity while
there was public pressure to hold him criminally responsible (Melle,
2013). The court eventually concluded that Breivik was sane and responsible, mainly by showing that he did not suffer from a psychotic
disorder as defined in ICD-10. This link between diagnostic disorder
categories in ICD-10 and the legal threshold for being psychotic as a
proxy for insanity was, however, not clarified or justified. The judgement was also based on incorrect statements about the relevant disorders, for instance that Breivik's ability to plan was hard to reconcile
with schizophrenia (Dahl, 2013).
The Breivik case resulted in the legislature removing the psychosis
criterion and replacing it by the above discussed criterion ‘severe deviant state of mind’ that has less direct medical references. In providing
larger judicial discretion, this criterion may result in larger variation in
the legal assessment of mentally disordered offenders, and in how the
experts' medical point of view is considered (Gröning, 2021). Moreover,
the core problems shown by the Breivik case are not unique to Norway
and not limited to high-profile cases or to specific insanity rules but are
present also in other countries. Insanity standards are generally vague,
offering discretion to judges and experts, and insanity judgments are
criticized for relying on underdeveloped assumptions about mental disorders.

3.2. The philosophical facets of the medical model
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On a fundamental level, the medical model relies on general philosophical premises concerning the nature of mental disorder, human
agency, the capacity for responsible behavior, as well as on moral intuitions about who is blameworthy (Moore, 1984; Moore, 1993). Criminal law, which includes the medical model in Norway, is in this regard,
paradigmatically built upon an account of the responsible person as
someone potentially guided rationally by reasons (Morse, 2016). A responsible agent, who is potentially blameworthy and a proper target of
punishment, is typically understood as normatively competent; capable
of rational reflection, and of recognizing and responding to reasons for
actions, factual as well as normative (Brink, 2013).
In the philosophical discourse, there are a multitude of understandings of the concepts involved as well as different theories of how to best
account for the requirements for moral (and legal) responsibility. Consequently, there are diverging views on the justifications of the insanity
doctrine, relating to different views of justification for punishment.
Criminal insanity is firmly connected to the idea, which can be traced
back to Aristotle, that only those morally responsible for a crime deserve punishment for it. In order to be responsible for one's actions, in
turn, the actions must be voluntary, and the agent must be aware of
what he or she is doing, and is capable of rational conduct in response.
This view is traditionally linked to retributivism, a theory of justice that
emphasises punishment as a just response to immoral acts (Moore,
1997). However, there are other views of the function or justification of
punishment which also justify an insanity defense. Deterrence theories
underscore the preventive effects of punishment and incapacitative theories emphasize the need to incapacitate dangerous agents (Walker,
1991). Consistent with these different justifications for punishment, the
insanity doctrine is either taken to shield morally innocent offenders
from undeserved punishment, or to exempt from punishment those who
are not in need of incapacitation or not deterrable by punishment
(Moore, 2015).
The Norwegian medical model is understood to involve both retributive and utilitarian justifications (Gröning et al., 2019). The primary justification is retributive and consists in arguments that some
mentally disordered offenders are not blameworthy. Offenders who
were ‘psychotic’ at the time of the offence, and with a pronounced intensity of psychotic symptoms have, in this regard, been assumed to
lack the capacity for responsible behavior (NOU 2014: 10, p. 111). In
addition to this retributive justification, the Norwegian medical model
also relies on deterrence justifications. The view is then typically that
there is no benefit from holding liable those who are in such a confused
and abnormal state of mind and that the criminal justice system's ability
to induce members of the public to obey the law through deterrence
and the formation of norms is not weakened by absolving these persons
of criminal responsibility (NOU 2014: 10, p. 85–86, see also Gröning &
Rieber-Mohn, 2015, p. 113).
Considering the more specific relevance of mental disorder for criminal responsibility, the medical model seems more clearly to involve
views and premises that conflicts with those involved in “mixed model”
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insanity doctrines –as it seemingly does not require any causal relation
between disorder and crime. As such it seemingly conflicts not only
with the legal insanity paradigm, but also with many of the current
most influential philosophical accounts operating within this paradigm
(Sinnott-Armstrong & Levy, 2011) that typically consider insanity with
reference to standards of capacity to understand and/or to control oneself. An influential view is here that the central question is whether a
disorder impairs the agent's practical reasoning in a given context –
which seems to require some kind of mixed model (Morse, 2016). However, contemporary philosophical discussions of insanity have also indicated interest in the medical model. Scholars has argued that insanity is
best considered a ‘status’ excuse, where madness itself deprives the individual of the status as a responsible agent (Moore, 2015). Such a view
seems to support the essential characteristic of the medical model, i.e.,
that insanity is identified exclusively with mental disorder without any
requirement that it influenced the particular criminal action.
Whether the medical model can be justified or not, thus seems to depend on which philosophical position on responsibility that is taken. At
the same time, it is an intriguing question whether a medical model
must be linked to a status excuse position, and what practical legal implications such a position in case have. From a practical legal perspective, a medical model can be mainly justified by arguments about the
proper functional division between the legislature, the judiciary, and
the experts. In Norwegian law, psychosis has also been used as proxy
for insanity in statutory legislation to reduce legal uncertainty and evidentiary problems (Gröning, 2015; Gröning et al., 2019). Moreover, the
justification for equating insanity with psychosis involves as discussed
above arguments to the effect that psychotic offenders lack the normal
ability to understand and control their actions, and therefore should not
be blamed and punished. Hence, to some extent, Norwegian law has involved a ‘mixed model approach’ at the legislative level, where the legislator's statutory definition of insanity has relied on paradigmatic philosophical premises about the causal relation between mental disorder
and criminal action. The argument is then that some (sufficiently) severe mental disorder states, cf. to be psychotic, for practical legal purposes can be assumed to influence action.
In addition, a medical model requires that the specified medical
condition required for insanity is present at the time of the act (cf. the
Norwegian Penal code section 20). This requirement follows from the
fundamental action centered and retributive account of criminal responsibility. When Norwegian law used the insanity criterion psychotic, it was therefore required that the defendant was actively psychotic while committing the crime. To evaluate insanity, one must also
within such a medical model consider for instance that the symptom
severity of mental disorders fluctuates over time and assess the severity
of the defendant's functional impairments in a specific context of action. This focus on the time of the act, may reduce the practical difference between a medical and mixed model approach.
To fully understand the premises and implications of the medical
model, more detailed examination is needed. To what extent and in
what way do for instance choices between alternative philosophical justifications in general, and the medical model in particular, set premises
for the relevance of mental disorder? The questions of what kind of
mental deficits that may qualify for insanity and why, and how diagnostic classifications matter need to be addressed. To explore this further,
philosophical analysis of core concepts such as agency, responsibility,
and blame, will be required, as well as deeper investigations into the
implications of different philosophical views on mental disorder both as
phenomenon and as an excuse. Another question of importance concerns potential epistemic challenges regarding knowledge transfer between medicine and law. Such an exploration may also enlighten how
and to what extent the medical model essentially differs from mixed
model approaches.

3.3. The practical legal facets of the medical model
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To understand the legal facets of the medical model, it is essential to
explore the ‘internal legal point of view’, i.e., the law's authoritative
self-description expressed in formal legal sources. Here we need to turn
our attention to medical model as it has been defined and applied in
practice in Norwegian law, and study the argumentation in (preparatory works/white papers to) the relevant legal rules, court cases and
academic legal work. Of specific interest is to identify the key arguments used to explain and justify criminal insanity and its relation to
mental disorder. To what extent is for instance the legal concept of psychosis linked to specific medical perspectives or premises, such as diagnoses or symptoms, and are there some standard arguments, such as the
ability to plan, that influences legal conclusions? And what about factors concerning the defendant and the character of the crime? Previous
studies indicate, for instance, that the defendant's gender influences insanity evaluations in court (Yourstone, Lindholm, M. G., et al., 2008).
To gain comprehensive understanding of the law's concepts of insanity and mental disorder, empirical studies of legal argumentation
are thus of importance. Legal empirical studies, today common in legal
research, are largely absent in current legal studies of insanity (see
Mackay, 1990; Mackay, Mitchell, & Howe, 2006; Steadman, 1985).
There is diverse research about different topics relating to the insanity
doctrine (Adjorlolo et al., 2019), such as studies providing data about
the (mis)use of the insanity defense related to the frequency and rate of
insanity acquittals, the attitudes of jurors, gender bias, and the diagnoses of those acquitted by reason of insanity. There are also studies of
the decision-making processes of forensic experts (Mandarelli et al.,
2019). However, none of these has clarified how insanity and psychosis
are conceptualised in authoritative legal sources. It is particularly central to study the application of rules in court cases, i.e., at the trial level,
as these may reveal a variety of premises for understanding the law's
concepts of insanity and psychosis.
Two of the authors of this article, have previously carried out a pilot
study of all published insanity cases between 2013 and 2018 relating to
the medical model in Norwegian law (Gröning et al., 2019). This study
indicated that insanity is associated with diagnoses (mainly schizophrenia) and psychosis symptoms (mainly hallucinations and delusions).
This is not surprising given that hallucinations and delusions are the
core positive symptoms in impaired reality testing, and that schizophrenia is the disorder in which they most often occur. Studies from other
countries show similar results (Callahan et al., 1991; Perlin, 2017b;
Tsimploulis, 2018). The law is unclear, however, about why and how
psychotic symptoms matter. Our study also indicated a variation in the
application of the rules because defendants with similar disorders are
judged differently. The study revealed that the character of the crime
and the defendant's ability to plan may affect judgments about the legal
concept of psychosis and insanity. This suggests that there are inconsistencies/variation in the legal material that occurs because normative/
cultural ideas about madness alter the legal understanding of psychosis.
In other words: the medical model as operationalized in Norwegian law
may in the end embody not a medical, but a normative, concept of mental disorder constructed from the folk psychological understanding of
insanity.
To reach a fuller understanding of the legal construct of insanity and
to identify inconsistencies and variations in the legal material, thorough multilayered examinations of the material are needed. Norway
has a relatively limited number of insanity cases. There is thus an opportunity to study all cases in which insanity has been tried in the Norwegian courts for a certain period (there are no official statistics, but
from our previous studies we expect that there are fewer than 250
cases/year). A further exploration of Norwegian insanity law should involve analysis of how the concepts of insanity and psychosis have
changed over time. Broader historical and legal cultural perspectives
would for instance help us to understand the reasons for possible varia-
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tions (Skålevåg, 2016). The concepts of insanity and psychosis must
also be studied across different legal domains, i.e., across rules,
preparatory works, court cases and legal academic work, and compared
to the use of concepts about mental disorder in other criminal and civil
law contexts.

recognizing and responding to reasons for actions – as it may be understood as an incapacity of doing this.
There are, however, commonly recognized difficulties in drawing
the line between intact and impaired reality testing, and the meaning of
the concept of impaired reality testing is generally unclear (Waters,
Blom, & Jadri, 2018). If the law should rely on the concept of impaired
reality testing, a clarification of its (legal) meaning is needed. There are
studies that may cast new light on the dimensional variables of legally
relevant constructs like hallucinations, delusions (Elahi, Perez, Varese,
et al., 2017; Hugdahl, 2015) commonly associated with impaired reality understanding. Such studies may also enlighten the relation between (psychosis) symptom severity and functional impairments
(Stratton, Brook, & Hanlon, 2017) relevant to law. If we manage to deconstruct the medical categories that are currently associates with insanity, we may also reach at a more precise explanation of the relevance of mental disorders to criminal responsibility.

F

3.4. The medical facets of the medical model
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The medical perspectives involved in an insanity doctrine must be
understood within a legal and normative framework, and not from a
purely medical or empirical point of view because these perspectives
are contingent on how insanity is legally defined. The mental health
discourse also typically serves other aims than informing the law. At the
same time, medical and scientific insights can be used to revisit the
law's current assumptions about mental disorders. The inclusion of such
insights seems especially important regarding the medical model, as it
identifies insanity entirely with mental disorder. It is here imperative to
explore the relevance of recent approaches in mental health research
and seeks to move beyond the psychiatric diagnostic framework.
Notwithstanding the usefulness of diagnostic categories, these are
clearly not developed for legal purposes (Moore, 2015; Morse, 2016;
see also Cautionary statement for forensic use of DSM-5). They are too
broad to aid in clarifying the legal concept of mental disorders because
there is such heterogeneity within each category, and they are subject
to continuous revisions. In addition, an association between insanity
and psychiatric diagnosis may stigmatise. Most persons with schizophrenia are not violent or criminal offenders for example (Fazel, Wolf,
Palm, & Lichtenstein, 2014; Whiting, Gulati, Geddes, & Fazel, 2021), although too many people think they are.
Thus, we suggest paying attention to the important shift that has occurred in mental health research, from diagnostic categories towards
dimensional approaches to psychopathology, both across diagnoses and
regarding symptom severity (Barch, 2017; Cuthbert, 2014; Cuthbert &
Insel, 2013). That is, psychotic symptoms such as delusions, hallucinations, and thought disturbances may be studied as distinct psychopathological phenomena which may occur in different disorders
across the psychosis spectrum, rather than only as part of a cluster of
symptoms within a specific diagnostic entity (such as schizophrenia or
bipolar disorder). These symptoms may also be recognized as present
on a continuum rather than categorically distinct phenomena, such as
for instance the dimensional axis that ranges from normal thoughts and
perceptions through extreme and overvalued ideas into manifest delusions. There is also a continuum between normal and pathological
mood relevant to the understanding of mood disorders (Ruscio, 2019).
To explore whether such approaches could contribute to legal clarification, a key focus should be on legal arguments about psychosis, as the
key condition within the Norwegian medical model as well as in the insanity doctrines of other countries. Based on our previous studies
(Gröning et al., 2019), such arguments appear to involve unclear assumptions about psychosis, with a stronger focus on diagnostic criteria
than dimensional evaluations. Dimensional and transdiagnostic insights about psychosis, may here be useful as a new point of entry to
critically scrutinize, evaluate and revisit legal arguments and assumptions about mental disorders. Are these assumptions valid, outdated, or
underdeveloped and, in case, what improvements are needed from the
scientific point of view?
Specific focus should here be paid to the concept of impaired reality
testing as the medical core concept of psychosis (Bebbington & Freeman,
2017; Hugdahl & Sommer, 2018). We have previously showed that impaired reality testing is central also to the law's concept of insanity, or
perhaps more accurately, to the law's understanding of psychosis as a
proxy for insanity (Gröning et al., 2019). The construct of impaired reality understanding also seems to have some relation to the philosophical account of the responsible person as someone capable of rationally

4. Towards a unified model of insanity and psychosis?
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We have shown how the medical model can be a gateway to get a
better understanding of the links between philosophical, legal, and
medical premises involved in insanity discussions. This approach also
encompasses the view that it may be possible to reconstruct the medical
model into a unified model valid across the involved disciplinary perspectives. Such a reconstruction is an ambitious task because it requires
systematizing and linking the various philosophical, legal, and medical
premises, and we will thus only highlight some preliminary steps in this
enterprise.
First, analyzing the validity of the identified involved philosophical,
legal and medical premises is required. Invalid premises inherent in existing accounts of the medical model, such as faulty medical premises
about disorders or gender bias in the law's application in practice of this
doctrine, should be excluded. The next step would be to analyse which
arguments should prevail in cases of conflict. Philosophical investigations will provide certain core alternative approaches to insanity and
psychosis, and thus reveal possible and sometimes necessary choices
between them. Moreover, we must recognize that any insanity doctrine
must be limited by the structure of criminal law and constitutional requirements. At least as long as we recognize criminal insanity as a fundamental legal doctrine, its general philosophical foundations and related criminal law principles carries certain structural requirement,
such as regarding this doctrine's systemic character as an excuse. On the
constitutional level, human rights requirements are central, and dictate
for instance that insanity standards cannot be discriminatory. The recent and debated United States Supreme Court case, Kahler v. Kansas,
exemplifies the implications of how such constitutional limitations are
understood and related (Kahler v. Kansas [2020] 589 (U.S.) (2020)). In
addition, we may pay attention to functional requirements of the insanity doctrine as a basis for legal rules, judgments and practices, such as
arguments about efficient proceedings or about the possibility to prove
the existence of certain conditions.
Careful attention must be paid to clarify the relevance of mental disorders. Somewhere along the continuum between normal and pathological phenomena we may define a quantitative or qualitative cut-off that
mirrors distinctions relevant for the law, and that may be translated
into clearer legal cut-off points than we have to date. An intriguing
question is whether the law's understanding of psychosis, embedded in
the medical model involves the relation of psychosis to the specific cognitive and control functions paradigmatically central to legal evaluations in mixed model insanity doctrines.
Any restructuring of current knowledge about psychosis requires attention to the interplay between existing psychiatric categories and the
understanding and definition of relevant symptoms and impairments
(Fellowes, 2017). For a more comprehensive understanding, relevant
(psychosis) symptoms may also be linked to their underpinning neuro-
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biology, the observable behavior, their emotional impact, and the societal and cultural context (Hugdahl & Sommer, 2018). A revisiting of the
medical model here raises questions about the law's understanding and
legal cultural interpretation of psychosis. For instance, how should psychotic delusions be understood and distinguished from ideological
ideas? The law seems to be more reluctant to accept that a seemingly
ideologically motivated perpetrator may (also) have been psychotic.
This legal point of view may ultimately challenge the link between insanity and scientific perspectives on mental disorders. Even if a medical
model would coincide with legal (folk psychologic) ideas, there may
also be conceptual arguments against its direct association between insanity and mental illness.
Another challenge to this relation is that the law does not allow for
the complexity embodied by mental health research. How can the law,
which needs to be relatively static over time, respond to the rapid development of science? We propose that a reconstruction of the medical
model through a dimensional account of psychosis may offer a link between normative views on insanity with empirical knowledge about
mental disorders as existing phenomena. A central premise is then that
the justified philosophical premises are at least to a certain extent compatible with the findings of newer mental health research. We find this
to be plausible, given that they basically share the same reference point:
human beings.
If such a synthesis of insights is successful and results in a (preliminary) unified insanity model, it must be subjected to a critical test by
comparing it with alternative insanity models, as its validity claim also
reaches beyond current dichotomies between existing mixed and medical insanity models. As discussed above, the general philosophical
premises underlying a medical model, to a large extent coheres with
premises involved in the mixed insanity model. Including the internal
legal point of view, we may also argue that the practical difference between the models is not significant. Still, at least as a matter of legal
principle, the mixed model operates with a two-stage evaluation, requiring both a disorder and that this influenced the crime. A crucial
question to answer is then whether our unified model will include the
latter stage in the mental disorder assessment. More specifically, will a
trans-diagnostic and dimensional account of psychosis as a core for our
proposed unified model allow for key normative viewpoints involved in
conflicting (mixed) models? If so, within this unified model, the distinction mixed and medical models, as they are traditionally understood,
will break down.

further explorations into the different kinds of premises involved in the
problem.
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